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INTRODUCTION
Adult guardianship is the state law process by which a court
appoints a surrogate to make decisions for an adult who is deemed
“incapacitated,” frequently by virtue of intellectual disability, mental
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illness, or cognitive impairment.1 Once an individual is under
guardianship, she loses her rights to make basic decisions about her
life, including where she lives, how to spend her money, and whether
to consent to health care.2 For the last several decades, guardianship
has been the subject of continual calls for reform, often spurred by
revelations of guardian malfeasance and other abuses in the system.3
Recent developments in international human rights law and
disability rights advocacy, however, pose a more fundamental
challenge to the institution. Article 12 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),4 with
its declaration that everyone, regardless of mental disability or
cognitive impairment, is entitled to make decisions and have those
decisions recognized under the law, offers no less than a promise to
end adult guardianship as we know it.5
Under Article 12, governments may not deprive individuals of their
“legal capacity,” or right to make decisions and have those decisions
recognized, on the grounds of disability or impaired decision-making
skills.6 Instead, cognitive and other mental disabilities trigger a right
to “support” in decision-making.7 This support can take the form of
1. See UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 102(5)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) (defining “incapacitated person”). See infra note 26 and
accompanying text for a discussion of who becomes subject to guardianship.
2. See id. §§ 315(a)(2),(4) (guardian may consent to health care, choose place of
residence) and 410(a)(2) (conservator may make any financial decision person could
have made). The UGPPA and a number of states differentiate between a
“conservator,” who is given power over a person’s financial matters, and a
“guardian,” who is given power over health care and personal decisions. For
purposes of this Article, I will refer to systems in which a surrogate is appointed to
make financial and/or personal decisions collectively as guardianship.
3. See infra notes 48–50, 83–84 and accompanying text.
4. G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 12, Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (Dec. 13, 2006).
5. Id.
6. G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 4, § 2; see also Comm. on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, art. 12, ¶ 13, 15, U.N. Doc CRPD/C/GC/1
(Apr. 11, 2014) (hereinafter “CRPD General Comment”) (explaining difference
between legal capacity and mental capacity and reiterating that Article 12 does not
permit the deprivation of legal decision-making rights on the grounds that an
individual’s decision-making skills are impaired).
Legal capacity is the ability to hold rights and duties (legal standing) and to
exercise those rights and duties (legal agency). It is the key to accessing
meaningful participation in society. Mental capacity refers to the decisionmaking skills of a person, which naturally vary from one person to another
and may be different for a given person depending on many factors,
including environmental and social factors.

Id.

7. See G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 4, § 3.
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accessible formats or technological assistance in communication.8 Or
it can take the form of “supported decision-making” arrangements, in
which “supporters” assist individuals with decision-making in
relationships of trust.9
In whatever form, the support is an
appropriate accommodation that enables the individual to enjoy the
right to legal capacity.10
The United States signed, but, somewhat notoriously, has not
ratified the CRPD.11 Nonetheless, the concept of “supported
decision-making” has generated significant excitement among
disability rights advocates. The federal Department of Health and
Human Services’ Administration for Community Living, which
promotes independent living for persons with disabilities and older
adults, has endorsed the concept and funded a national resource
center on the topic.12 Pilot projects to provide supported decisionmaking services continue to spring up around the country.13
But as proponents of supported decision-making have made
significant inroads in persuading the disability rights community that
guardianships should be supplanted by this more rights-based
alternative, questions persist about how it could and should work in
practice. Nina Kohn and others have pointed to a dearth of empirical
data on how supported decision-making actually functions to support

8.
9.
10.
under

CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 29 (describing supported decision-making regimes).
For a full discussion of support as a reasonable accommodation required
U.S. law by the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Leslie Salzman,

Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision-making as a Violation of the
Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO.

L. REV. 157 (2010).
11. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Senate Rejects Treaty to Protect Disabled
Around the World, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2012.
12. Aaron Bishop & Edwin Walker, Preserving the Right to Self-Determination:
Supported Decision-Making, ACL BLOG, http://www.acl.gov/NewsRoom/blog/2015/
2015_01_28.aspx [https://perma.cc/6TP8-WXFW].
13. See, e.g., Funding Announcement: Supported Decision-Making, N.Y. STATE
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES PLANNING COUNCIL, http://www.ddpc.ny.gov/sites/
default/files/Supported%20Decision%20Making%20RFP%20Final%20Electronic%20
Version_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KH2-2F9R] (announcing availability of funds to
launch a supported decision-making pilot project); see also The Arc of San Angelo:
Volunteer-Supported Decision-Making, TEX. DEP’T OF AGING & DISABILITY SERVS.,
http://www.tcdd.texas.gov/projects/grants-completed-projects/the-arc-of-san-angelo/
[http://perma.cc/LT95-BCQ9] (describing pilot project run by the Arc of San Angelo,
with funding from the Texas Council for Developmental Disabilities); Pilot Project,
CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, http://supporteddecisions.org/ [https://perma.cc/
L5A3-L5KV] (describing supported decision-making pilot run by Center for Public
Representation and Nonotuck Resource Associates in Northampton, Massachusetts).
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the normative and ethical arguments for it.14 Advocates are
beginning to address those critiques by developing assessment tools
for emerging pilot projects.15
Perhaps the most significant hurdle in shifting opinion toward
supported decision-making is developing an argument for it that
addresses the particular concerns of a significant, and likely growing,
segment of those under guardianships: older persons, many of whom
have cognitive impairments such as dementia. Older persons are
believed to comprise a majority of the persons under guardianships16
but, to date, their particular concerns have not been a central part of
the legal capacity discussion. Supported decision-making has its roots
in the disability rights movement.17 Mental health consumers have
also embraced the concept as a means of preserving their rights to
make decisions about medical treatment and their lives.18
However, if supported decision-making is to take hold and
supplant guardianship, attention must be paid to older persons and
the particular ways that they might benefit from the shift. The legal
model cannot change unless it makes sense to, and offers
improvements for, the majority of people subject to it. Indeed, the
aging of the population and the increase in Alzheimer’s disease and
dementia threaten to place a greater amount of older persons at risk
of guardianship. The Alzheimer’s Association predicts that the

14. See generally Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable
Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111 (2013) (arguing that little is

known about how supported decision-making works in practice and proposing an
empirical research agenda).
15. See, e.g., HUMAN SERVICES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SUPPORTED DECISION
MAKING PILOT: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH, PILOT EVALUATION YEAR 1 REPORT
(2015), http://supporteddecisions.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/SDM-EvaluationReport-Year-1_HSRI-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCP8-MDTS].
16. See ERICA F. WOOD, A.B.A., STATE LEVEL ADULT GUARDIANSHIP DATA: AN
EXPLORATORY SURVEY 11–14 (2006), http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/Resources/
Publication/docs/GuardianshipData.pdf [https://perma.cc/P748-UB7A] (summarizing
limited empirical data that is available on guardianship).
17. See GUARDIANSHIP SUMMIT, BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP: SUPPORTED DECISIONMAKING BY INDIVIDUALS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 1–2 (2011),
http://nlrc.acl.gov/Legal_Issues/Guardianship/docs/kris_glen_paper_final_10-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3QS-CDQE] (finding that the CRPD, which utilizes supported
decision-making, was a consequence of “activism and participation by the disability
rights movement”).
18. See TINA MINKOWITZ, WORLD NETWORK OF USERS AND SURVIVORS OF
PSYCHIATRY, LEGAL CAPACITY AS RIGHT, PRINCIPLE AND PARADIGM: SUBMISSION
TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN RESPONSE TO
ITS CALL FOR PAPERS ON THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLE 12 (2011), http://www.wnusp.net/documents/2012/WNUSP_Article12_
Submission.doc [https://perma.cc/RH45-76JV].
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annual number of new cases of Alzheimer’s and other dementias is
expected to double by 2050.19 Supported decision-making and/or
other alternatives must be attractive and viable options if, for them,
guardianship is to be supplanted, or at least minimized in its use.
Without that embrace by older adult advocates, the movement
toward supported decision-making is likely to stall or leave out a large
portion of the population potentially subject to guardianship.20
This Article argues that the paradigm shift away from guardianship
to a right to legal capacity can and should apply to older persons who
would otherwise be at risk of guardianship. But, in order for it to
take root, the theoretical underpinnings of the right to legal capacity
should be expanded to more fully encompass the experience of older
persons who would otherwise be at risk of guardianship. Proponents
also need to grapple with legitimate hesitations and objections
concerning potential for abuse, as well as practicability. This Article
attempts to fill in those gaps by offering a normative argument for
supported decision-making rooted in the particular concerns of older
adults facing the loss of their rights. It then suggests a number of
contexts in which a shift away from guardianship for older persons
may be achieved most readily.
Part I describes guardianship and its limitations, even after the
most recent wave of reform, which emphasized some preservation of
autonomy for those with impaired decision-making abilities. Part II
traces the emergence of the right to “legal capacity” and the
development of supported decision-making as a replacement for
guardianships in the intellectual disability community. Part III
compares the concerns of older adults at risk of guardianship to those
of persons with intellectual disabilities and describes the ways in
which their interests and concerns with regard to legal capacity
overlap and diverge. Part IV sketches out a normative justification
for preserving the legal capacity of older adults. Finally, Part V
19. ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2015 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 20
(2015) http://www.alz.org/facts/downloads/facts_figures_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9QAG-NX9H].
20. Advocates for the rights of older persons also have a separate, but related,
interest in sorting out a position on questions of legal capacity in advance of further
efforts to arrive at an international human rights treaty on the rights of older persons.
See G.A. Res. 65/18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/182, ¶ 28 (Dec. 21, 2010) (establishing
working group to consider the feasibility of additional instruments to protect the
human rights of older persons). See generally Israel Doron & Itai Apter, The Debate
Around the Need for an International Convention on the Rights of Older Persons, 50
GERONTOLOGIST 586, 587 (2010). Legal capacity is not the primary focus of such
efforts but could prove to be a stumbling block should there be incoherence around
the principles that would apply.
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discusses the practicability of moving toward a supported decisionmaking model. It identifies ways in which the availability of a
supported decision-making model can offer tangible benefits and
identifies areas where further thinking is needed.
I. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AFTER RECENT REFORMS
In order to understand what supported decision-making and the
right to legal capacity21 can offer older persons, as well as the
backdrop of what they might replace, it is first necessary to consider
the current state of guardianship law and practice. This part describes
the basic process of guardianship, and then discusses the most recent
round of reforms that began nearly thirty years ago in the wake of
media accounts of widespread exploitation and abuse in guardianship.
It then concludes that reforms have only been a limited success in that
practice has not conformed to legal changes that were supposed to
preserve autonomy for persons under guardianship.
A. The Mechanism of Guardianship
Adult guardianship is a state law process, often occurring in
probate court. It is the legal system’s response to an adult who is or
becomes mentally “incapacitated” and is deemed unable to make
legally binding decisions.22 Most definitions of incapacity require two
findings: (1) the individual is at risk of harm because of an inability to
provide for personal or financial needs; and (2) the individual lacks
the cognitive ability to understand and appreciate decisions.23 The
central premise of guardianship is that the law will protect the person
by appointing a surrogate to protect her from either her bad decisions

21. Supported decision-making is one means by which an individual may avoid
guardianship and avoid being stripped of her right to legal capacity. However, it is
important to recognize that legal capacity can be taken away from individuals
through means other than guardianship and that the right to legal capacity is broader
than a right to supported decision-making. See generally CRPD General Comment,
supra note 6, ¶ 7.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2016).
23. For example, the Uniform Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act
defines incapacity with respect to managing property as “an impairment in the ability
to receive and evaluate information or make decisions, even with the use of
appropriate technological assistance.” UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE
PROCEEDINGS ACT § 401(2)(a) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1997). New York’s Article 81
guardianship statute defines an incapacitated person as one “likely to suffer harm
because: 1. the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or property
management; and 2. the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate the
nature and consequences of such inability.” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b)
(McKinney 2016).
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or her inability to make decisions.24 Guardianship removes the legal
right of the incapacitated person to make decisions and vests that
right with a surrogate. The person under guardianship ceases to be “a
legal actor” whose decisions receive legal recognition.25
Guardianships have typically affected three main groups: (1) older
adults with cognitive impairments, such as dementia and, to a lesser
extent, those living with stroke-related conditions; (2) persons with
intellectual disabilities; and (3) persons with psychosocial
disabilities.26 In recent years, as more attention has been brought to
traumatic brain injury, that too has been counted as an impairment
giving rise to guardianship.27 Of course, an individual may fall into
not just one but also two or three of these categories at the same time
or over the course of a lifetime. Under many guardianship regimes,
particularly now that many states use a functional assessment
approach to incapacity determinations, the individual’s particular
diagnosis or condition is not supposed to be determinative; what is
supposed to matter is the functional ability to make decisions.28
The removal of decision-making power is a significant deprivation
of individual rights.29 Once under guardianship, persons may lose the
right to choose where they live,30 how they spend their money,31 with
24. See In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 571–73 (Iowa 1995)
(describing history of guardianship as protective mechanism). Various schemes talk
of persons under guardianship as “protected persons.” See, e.g., UGPPA § 401
(creating “protective proceedings” for individuals’ property). The guardian, in turn,
is deemed to provide “protection.” Id. § 318.
25. Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity,
Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 119 (2012).
26. See id. at 93 n.1. The condition that shows up in the most guardianship filings
is dementia. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. JENUWINE, THE STATE OF ADULT GUARDIANSHIP
IN INDIANA: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 46, in INDIANA ADULT GUARDIANSHIP
STATE TASK FORCE, WHO’S OVERSEEING THE OVERSEERS? A REPORT ON THE STATE
OF ADULT GUARDIANSHIP IN INDIANA (2012), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/
files/ad-guard-2012-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JDS6-GR3F]. In the study of
Indiana filings, dementia was mentioned in 25.8% of filings, compared to 22% for
cognitive/intellectual impairment and 10.5% for severe mental illness. Id. Strokerelated conditions were described in 5.4% and a general category of “conditions
associated with old age” comprised 1.4%. Id.
27. See JENUWINE, supra note 26, at 62.
28. See UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT prefatory
note (characterizing 1997 revision to uniform guardianship law as requiring a
functional analysis).
29. See In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 575 (Iowa 1995)
(“Guardianship involves such a significant loss of liberty that we now hold that the
ward is entitled to the full panoply of procedural due process rights comparable to
those present in involuntary civil commitment proceedings.”).
30. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(a)(9) (McKinney 2010).
31. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(a) (McKinney 2015).
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whom they spend their time, and with whom they have
relationships.32 They cannot enter contracts, authorize the disclosure
of their medical records, or make health care decisions.33 Thus,
commentators have said that the person under a guardianship is
reduced to “the status of a child”34 with the loss of the basic civil
rights that adults enjoy. The late Congressman Claude Pepper
famously put it another way: “[t]he typical ward has fewer rights than
the typical convicted felon.”35 Others have described guardianship as
a “civil death.”36
Why does the law permit such an incursion? On the theoretical
level, the justification is parens patriae, the ancient power of the state
to protect those who are thought not able to protect themselves.37
Historically, the king and his representatives exercised this power to
wrest control over property.38 The common law, and later “lunacy”
statutes, continued this practice in the United States, and the law
further evolved to embrace a general principle that the state has an
obligation to protect those deemed unable to care for themselves.39
Whereas the theoretical justification for guardianship is the state’s
protective power, in practice guardianships over older adults typically
are sought when a relative, friend, or health care institution believes
one of two situations has arisen: (1) some legally binding decision
needs to be made and the person is thought not able to make it; or (2)
the person is making decisions thought to be irrational and/or harmful
to themselves. In the first circumstance, guardianships become
necessary due to the barriers imposed by two other doctrines that
involve cognitive tests: informed consent for medical decisions and
contractual capacity, both of which demand that decision-makers be
32. Id. § 81.22(2); see also Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567 (challenging guardianship
brought by man whose guardian limited his time with his girlfriend and forbade him
from marrying her).
33. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.21, 81.22.
34. Hedin, 528 N.W.2d at 572 (quoting Sheryl Dicker, Guardianship: Overcoming
the Last Hurdle to Civil Rights for the Mentally Disabled, U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 485, 485 (1981)).
35. Abuses in Guardianship of the Elderly and Infirm: A National Disgrace:
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Aging, 100th Cong. 8 (1987) (statement of
Claude Pepper, Chairman of H. Select Comm. On Aging).
36. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of

the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road
from Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 9 (2012).
37. See Margaret K. Krasik, The Lights of Science and Experience: Historical
Perspectives on Legal Attitudes Toward the Role of Medical Expertise in
Guardianship of the Elderly, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 203 (1989).
38. Id. at 204.
39. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 164.
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able to understand and appreciate the consequences of their decisions
and be able to communicate a decision.40 The inability to pass the
“understand and appreciate” threshold is what drives many older
people into guardianships, because third parties demand a legally
cognizable actor to make health care decisions, engage in banking
transactions, enter a residential lease, or engage in other real estate
and financial transactions.41 If the person has the resources and
inclination to execute an advance directive, such as a power of
attorney or health care proxy, before experiencing significant
cognitive decline, the law typically looks to the agent in those
documents to make decisions.42 However, in the absence of such
documents, or in situations when the named agents cannot act or
could abuse their powers, a need for guardianship may arise.43
In the second circumstance, a family member, government social
services agency, health care institution, or other concerned party
believes that an individual is at risk of financial or physical harm
because of impaired decision-making ability. A concerned person or
agency may petition the court to take away a person’s decisionmaking rights to stop or remedy financial or other abuse.44 Or, one
family member may believe that another family member is not caring
40. On informed consent, see In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222, 1241 (N.J. 1985)
(patient must be able to understand information conveyed, evaluate options, and
communicate a decision). On capacity to contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRACTS § 15(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing that contract is voidable “if by
reason of mental illness or defect . . . he is unable to understand in a reasonable
manner the nature and consequences of the transaction” or “he is unable to act in a
reasonable manner . . . and the other party has reason to know of his condition”).
See also Ortelere v. Teacher’s Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 464 (N.Y. 1969)
(party must be able to make a rational judgment about the transaction). It is also
black-letter law that each party to a contract manifest her assent to the transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
41. See YOTAM TOLUB, THE ISRAEL HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES, ALTERNATIVES TO GUARDIANSHIP IN FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 14 (Noga
Kadman & Maya Johnston eds., Debbie Cohen trans.), http://bizchut.org.il/en/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/Alternative-to-Guardianship-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
8ABP-8FTP].
42. See, e.g., In re May Far C., 877 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); In re
Matter of Isadora R., 773 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
43. See, e.g., In re Nora McL.C., 764 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(affirming appointment of independent guardian where niece had abused power of
attorney).
44. See infra notes 150–51 (third parties can petition the court for guardianship);
PowerPoint: Jean Callahan & Raquel Romanick, Brookdale Center for Healthy
Aging, Understanding Guardianship in New York State, Slide 17 (Nov. 2015)
(unpublished presentation) (on file with author) (financial abuse mentioned as
reason for guardianship in 12% of petitions reviewed in a sample of New York state
guardianship cases).
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properly for the person, and use a guardianship as a form of an adult
custody battle.45 Or, the person may live in objectionable, hoarding
conditions that the petitioner seeks to remedy through a
guardianship.46
Should the guardianship function as intended—with the surrogate
acting responsibly and in keeping with the individual’s wishes, it could
be a useful tool for maximizing her welfare while promoting her
preferences. Indeed, the National Guardianship Association, the
leading professional group in the field, promotes as one of its
standards of practice that the guardian shall “identify and advocate
for the person’s goals, needs and preferences.”47 However, as is
described in Section I.B, many guardianships are not that ideal,
efforts to improve the system have been only a partial success, and,
even at their best, guardianship still deprives the person of basic
human rights.
B.

Recent Reform Efforts

Concern about abuse within the guardianship system prompted a
major wave of reform, starting in the late 1980s.48 These reforms
were spurred by a major Associated Press exposé that portrayed a
lawless system, under which older adults were summarily stripped of
their rights, and then frequently subjected to exploitation by
guardians whose actions went unchecked by the courts.49 In the wake
of the AP’s report, which termed the guardianship system a “national
disgrace,” reformers succeeded in overhauling the guardianship
statutes in eighteen states between the late-1980s and late-1990s.50
Much of the impetus for guardianship reform came from the legal
community, with the American Bar Association playing a critical

45. See In re Camoia, No. 100250/2012, 2015 WL 4877675 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
46. See Callahan & Romanick, supra note 44, at Slide 17 (hoarding mentioned in
three percent of guardianship petitions reviewed in sample).
47. NAT’L GUARDIANSHIP ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 6 (4th ed. 2013),
http://www.guardianship.org/documents/Standards_of_Practice.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BB3X-ZSYH].
48. See Glen, supra note 25, at 108–10.
49. See id. 109; Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardians of the Elderly: An
Ailing System Part II: Many Elderly Never Get Their Day in Court, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Sept. 20, 1987, 11:50 PM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Guardians-ofthe-Elderly-An-Ailing-System-Part-II-Many-Elderly-Never-Get-Their-Day-InCourt/id-8ea94c1c992fd97e7eea7fe72a924f73 [https://perma.cc/5YRP-7FQK].
50. See A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where is the Constitutional Crisis with
Procedural Safeguards and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication?, 7 ELDER
L.J. 33, 79 & n.398 (1999) (summarizing changes in state guardianship laws).
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role.51 These reformers were leery of guardianships,52 and sought to
limit their role significantly, especially when guardianships were
brought to further a third party’s interest, or when less restrictive
alternatives would suffice.53 But for the most part, these reformers
stopped short of calling for the abolition of guardianship. Few
challenged the fundamental premise of guardianships—that the
solution to an adult’s impaired decision-making is to wrest away her
legal right to make decisions and deposit it into the hands of a
surrogate.54 Thus, the debates largely took place around how an
improved guardianship process should work, what had to be proven
to appoint a guardian, how the courts should monitor the activities of
the surrogate, and how extensive the guardian’s powers should be.55
Reformers succeeded in changing the standard for determining
whether to appoint a guardian from a diagnostic-based, medical
declaration of incompetency to a functional assessment of the
person’s ability to make decisions.56 They also imported due process
into guardianship proceedings and mandated that an individual’s
rights could not be taken away without a hearing, often with a right to
counsel.57 They further imposed reporting obligations on guardians

51. See Glen, supra note 25, at 108–09; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
GUARDIANSHIP SYMPOSIUM AND POLICY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION iii
(1989) http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2011/
2011_aging_gship_agda_refrm.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2ZW-6A8N]
[hereinafter GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM].
52. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited
Guardianship, 31 STETSON L. REV. 735, 740 (2002) (describing attitude of suspicion
and antagonism toward guardianship).
53. See GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 51, at 3.
54. See Glen, supra note 25, at 119 (noting that the most recent guardianship
reforms pushed for a mode of guardian decision-making in which the person’s
preferences would be adhered to but still transfer the decision-making right to the
guardian).
55. See generally id. at 108-19 (breaking these reforms of the last thirty years into
two rounds: the first addressing procedural protections and the move toward a
functional, as opposed to medical, assessment of incapacity, and the second
addressing the advent of substitute decision-making—making decisions for the
person based on what she would have decided as opposed to using the more
paternalistic best interests rubric).
56. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(c) (McKinney 2016) (describing
functional assessment in determining whether person is incapacitated); see also
Phillip B. Tor & Bruce D. Sales, A Social Science Perspective on the Law of
Guardianship: Directions for Improving the Process and Practice, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 7 (1994).
57. See Tor & Sales, supra note 56, at 3.
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so that courts could monitor how guardians performed after their
appointments.58
Reformers also embraced the concept of “least restrictive
alternative,” which had emerged in constitutional litigation involving
involuntary commitment of persons with mental illness.59 First,
revised statutes sought to end “plenary” guardianship, which grants a
guardian virtually unfettered decision-making authority over all
aspects of a person’s life.60 Instead, reformed guardianship statutes
require that courts tailor guardianship so that the guardian is given
only those powers necessary to meet the person’s needs.61 The
person under guardianship is supposed to retain decision-making
powers over other aspects of their lives not specifically designated to
the guardian’s control.62 These ambitious aims are reflected in the
“findings and purpose” language of New York’s primary adult
guardianship law, which reads more like a declaration of individual
rights than the preface to a statutory scheme that authorizes surrogate
decision-making:
The legislature finds that it is desirable for and beneficial to persons
with incapacities to make available to them the least restrictive form
of intervention which assists them in meeting their needs but, at the
same time, permits them to exercise the independence and selfdetermination of which they are capable. The legislature declares
that it is the purpose of this act to promote the public welfare by
establishing a guardianship system which is appropriate to satisfy
either personal or property management needs of an incapacitated
person in a manner tailored to the individual needs of that person,
which takes in account the personal wishes, preferences and desires
of the person, and which affords the person the greatest amount of
independence and self-determination and participation in all the
decisions affecting such person’s life.63

The other way in which the least restrictive alternative concept was
applied to guardianships involved codifying the notion that

58. Tor & Sales, supra note 56, at 30.
59. See Glen, supra note 25, at 108 & n.67; see also Michael L. Perlin, “Their
Promises of Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional “Least
Restrictive Alternative” Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 999,
1010–17 (2000).
60. See Frolik, supra note 52, at 735 n.4, 740–41.
61. See, e.g., Frolik, supra note 52, at 735 n.4.
62. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.29(a) (McKinney 2010) (stating that
person under guardianship retains all powers and rights except those granted to the
guardian).
63. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2016).
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guardianships are a means of last resort.64 Even if a person is deemed
“incapacitated,” courts are supposed to reject a guardianship when
the person has in place sufficient alternatives, such as a power of
attorney or other resources, to meet their needs.65
In addition, as the statutory language above suggests, there was
some effort to change the standard for decision-making by guardians
from a historical “best interests” standard to one that took into
account the wishes, preferences, and desires of the person—what has
been termed “substituted judgment.”66 Kristin Booth Glen has
described this as a separate, later phase of the most recent reform
movement, “intended to maximize the incapacitated person’s dignity
and autonomy.”67 In their study of decision-making standards for
guardians, Linda Whitton and Lawrence Frolik found that eighteen
jurisdictions have some resemblance of the “substituted judgment”
language in their guardianship statutes, but that fourteen of those also
have “best interests” language as well.68
On paper, these reforms were significant. In practice, however,
they can be judged as a limited success. As Lawrence Frolik has
argued, despite the significant changes in guardianship law, the
culture and practice remain largely unchanged.69 There is limited
empirical data about guardianship in general, but the few in-depth
studies of state court files demonstrate that these reforms have, in
large part, not been implemented as intended. First, even though
statutes require consideration of less restrictive alternatives and
demand a high threshold for a finding of incapacity, guardianship
petitions are rarely denied and proceedings are often pro forma and
procedurally flawed, with persons alleged to be incapacitated

64. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.02 (a)(2) (McKinney 2016) (stating
that guardianships should only be appointed if necessary), 81.03(e) (McKinney 2004)
(requiring courts to assess other “available resources” such as powers of attorney,
health care proxies, and representative payees, when assessing whether a person
needs a guardian).
65. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.02(a)(2), 81.03(e); see also In re May Far
C., 61 A.D.3d 680, 668 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); In re Isadora R., 773 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004).
66. See Glen, supra note 25, at 98-99.
67. Id. at 119.
68. Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making
Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1499 (2012).
69. Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best Is the Enemy of
the Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 348 (1998) (“But the rock of guardianship
culture and practice still stands, and stands mainly unchanged.”).
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frequently appearing without counsel in some states.70 It is also quite
common for guardians to be appointed for an indefinite duration, as
opposed to a limited time necessary to resolve whatever crisis
prompted the guardianship.71
Second, notwithstanding the statutory thumb on the scale toward
limiting the powers granted to guardians (and thereby taken away
from the individual), courts continue to grant broad plenary powers
to guardians in the majority of cases.72 Courts favor wholesale grants
of power to guardians because they fear the burden of hearing future
applications from guardians every time a new need arises that might
warrant an expansion of the guardian’s powers.73 Thus, plenary
guardianships are overwhelmingly the norm.74 For example, a recent
study reviewed all guardianship filings in 2008 in certain Indiana
courts and found that limited guardianships were granted in less than
one percent of the cases.75
Third, while it appears that substituted judgment standards have
had some effect, it remains unclear how much success they have had
on making sure that a guardian effectuates the person’s wishes. In a
survey of guardians, Whitton and Frolik found that the presence of
substituted judgment language in statutes correlated with more
conversations by guardians with the individuals regarding their
preferences in health care and other decisions.76 The survey also
found that guardians continued to take into consideration what they
believed to be in the individuals’ best interests when making decisions

70. Pamela B. Teaster et al., Wards of the State: A National Study of Public
Guardianship, 37 STETSON L. REV. 193, 199 (2007) (summarizing a 1994 study

showing most hearings are very brief, most respondents are not represented, and
evidence presented is limited); JENUWINE, supra note 26, at 44 (stating that in 97.6%
of cases reviewed in an Indiana study, persons alleged to be incapacitated were
unrepresented by counsel); WOOD, supra note 16, at 12 (finding that 64% of
guardianships were granted before an attorney was appointed and 92% were granted
before a court investigator’s report).
71. See Callahan & Romanick, supra note 44, at Slide 7 (finding that of 1636
guardianship petitions that had been fully adjudicated, 972 resulted in permanent
guardianship).
72. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 245 n.51 (2010) (citing studies that found
limited guardianships in 0% to 7% of cases and 13% of cases); see also Teaster et al.,
supra note 70, at 219, 234; Frolik, supra note 52, at 740–44 (explaining that courts
prefer, and often invoke, plenary guardianship, despite the option for limited
guardianship because of its advantages).
73. See Frolik, supra note 52, at 741–44.
74. See Teaster et al., supra note 70, at 219, 234.
75. See JENUWINE, supra note 26, at 49.
76. See Whitton & Frolik, supra note 68, at 1534.
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on their behalf.77 There is scant case law in which persons under
guardianship challenge guardian decision-making for not taking
account of their wishes, likely because of how difficult it is for persons
under guardianship to obtain legal assistance to challenge decisions
by their guardians.78
Fourth, studies have shown that guardianship monitoring in many
states ranges from non-existent to deeply flawed and reports of
guardianship abuse persist.79 In a report on a survey of judges and
court personnel, the National Center for State Courts quoted a
number of respondents as stating that their courts did not have the
resources to adequately monitor guardianships.80 With regard to
checking on the personal well-being of the person under
guardianship, as opposed to checking on the accounting of finances,
the Center concluded that “[f]ew courts regularly monitor the
condition of the incapacitated person.”81 Such findings have also
appeared on the state level. For example, a recent study of
guardianships in Pennsylvania reports that seventy-five percent of
clerks in the courts that handle guardianships do not monitor whether
the guardian submits the initial inventory—an accounting of assets
that the person possesses at the beginning of a guardianship—and
sixty-nine percent of clerks do not monitor whether the guardian
submits annual reports.82 A 2010 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report “identified hundreds of allegations of physical abuse,
neglect and financial exploitation by guardians in 45 states and the

77. Whitton & Frolik, supra note 68, at 1534.
78. See Jenica Cassidy, Restoration of Rights in the Termination of Adult
Guardianship, 23 ELDER L.J. 83, 102 (2015) (describing the difficulties persons under
guardianship have in finding, retaining, and affording counsel, especially because
they are no longer in control of their money, to pursue restoration of their rights).
79. See BRENDA K. UEKERT, CENTER FOR ELDERS AND THE COURTS, ADULT
GUARDIANSHIP COURT DATA AND ISSUES: RESULTS FROM AN ONLINE SURVEY 5
(2010),
http://www.guardianship.org/reports/Guardianship_Survey_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DG8P-M75N];
GUARDIANSHIP
MONITORING
COMMITTEE,
GUARDIANSHIP MONITORING COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 118
(2014), http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/page-543/file-4022.pdf?cb=1444534377573
[https://perma.cc/5748-B6WL]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1046,
GUARDIANSHIPS: CASES OF FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION, NEGLECT, AND ABUSE OF
SENIORS 27 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-1046].
80. See UEKERT, supra note 79, at 24–25; see also Arian Campos-Flores & Ashby
Jones, Abuses Plague System of Legal Guardians for Adults, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30,
2015, 1:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/abuse-plagues-system-of-legal-guardiansfor-adults-1446225524 [https://perma.cc/U7RF-8YQD] (providing examples of abuse
and the lack of oversight for guardians).
81. See UEKERT, supra note 79, at 5.
82. See GUARDIANSHIP MONITORING COMMITTEE, supra note 79, at 118, 138.
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District of Columbia between 1990 and 2010.”83 A steady drumbeat
of press reports from around the country has confirmed that these
deficiencies persist and point to a lack of monitoring and enforcement
by court systems.84
To be sure, this account has focused on the shortcomings, not the
cases in which guardians assisted a vulnerable individual by providing
needed services and care.85 It has also not focused on describing the
many substantial efforts afoot to improve matters and to make sure
that the guardianship system functions as intended.86 Or the many
times that court monitors have caught guardians who have attempted
to cheat the persons whom they are supposed to be protecting.87 But,
as a systemic matter, it is hard to conclude that the reformed
guardianship regimes have delivered on their promises of enhanced
autonomy and accountability.

83. GAO-10-1046, supra note 79. To cite just one example, the GAO recounted a
New York case in which the guardian misappropriated at least $327,000 to herself,
family, and friends from an eighty-two-year-old retired judge—all while presiding
over the decrease of his estate from several million dollars to almost nothing. Id. at
13.
84. See, e.g., Campos-Flores Jones, supra note 80; Colton Lochhead, Clark
County’s Private Guardians May Protect—or Just Steal and Abuse, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL (Apr. 13, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/
las-vegas/clark-county-s-private-guardians-may-protect-or-just-steal-and-abuse
[https://perma.cc/Q9GK-LZNW]; Shannon Mullen, Investigation: Betrayal of Trust:
Stealing from Seniors, ASBURY PARK PRESS (June 27, 2015), http://www.app.com/
story/news/investigations/watchdog/investigations/2015/06/27/guardianship-abuseincapacity-trial/71006830/ [https://perma.cc/H4XM-2ME2]; Lucas Sullivan, Jill
Riepenhoff, Mike Wagner & Josh Jarman, Elderly, Mentally Ill & Children Trapped
in Broken Court System, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (May 18, 2014, 12:26 PM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/05/18/elderly-mentally-ill-andchildren-trapped-in-broken-court-system.html [https://perma.cc/7J7G-XQ5V]; Lise
Olsen, Guardianship Putting Thousands of Elderly Texans at Risk, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Nov. 3, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/
article/Guardians-for-the-elderly-and-disabled-paid-2251312.php
[https://perma.cc/
EZM4-CBNL].
85. See Callahan & Romanick, supra note 44, at Slide 23 (noting that financial
management was put in place in forty-three percent of case files reviewed and that
services or care were arranged in forty-two percent of case files reviewed).
86. See, e.g., NATIONAL GUARDIANSHIP NETWORK, WINGS TIPS: STATE
REPLICATION GUIDE FOR WORKING INTERDISCIPLINARY NETWORKS OF
GUARDIANSHIP
STAKEHOLDERS
3–5
(2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2014_wings_implementation_guide.authch
eckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/C54X-SS26] (describing court-community partnerships
promoted by the National Guardianship Network in a number of states to improve
practices).
87. See, e.g., In re Gilvary, 938 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (censuring
guardian for writing checks out of the guardian account without authority to do so).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND THE
RIGHT TO “LEGAL CAPACITY”
A growing chorus of critics argues that even under the best
guardianship, the mere fact that the guardianship has adjudged an
individual as incapacitated or incompetent, and stripped her of the
right to act on her own behalf, causes significant harm.88 As Leslie
Salzman argues, this deprivation of rights undermines an individual’s
independence, diminishes her status in the eyes of others, stigmatizes
her, and results in her constructive isolation from civil society.89 The
question is whether the law can offer an alternative mechanism in
these situations, one that does not strip the individual of her legal
rights and rather recognizes her as a legal actor who makes decisions.
This is the goal of the movement for the right to legal capacity.
When states were reforming their guardianship laws, advocates for
persons with intellectual disabilities were developing a wholly
different model to address legal decision-making. Kristin Booth Glen
traces this “paradigm shift,” which re-conceptualized the right to
decision-making for persons with cognitive impairments, to three
contemporaneous phenomena: the rise of the disability rights
movement, the development of integration mandates for children and
adults with intellectual disabilities, and the rise of human rights
norms, both in general and as tools used by the disability rights
movement.90
The concept of supported decision-making traces its roots to the
early 1990s in Canada, where independent living advocates for
persons with disabilities grappled with the obstacles that guardianship
and other forms of surrogate decision-making imposed for persons
seeking to live more autonomously.91 Supported decision-making
“was seen to be a way to remove legal barriers created by issues of
competency, which prevented people with intellectual disabilities”
from making decisions about finances.92 Instead, advocates proposed
88. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 168–69; see also Glen, supra note 25, at 119
(“[T]he person under guardianship is not, or is no longer, a legal actor.”) (alteration
in original).
89. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 168–69.
90. Glen, supra note 25, at 123–38.
91. MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, LAW COMM’N OF ONTARIO, A NEW
PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY:
ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 33–34 (2010), http://www.lco-cdo.org/disabilities/bachkerzner.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA35-FPWU].
92. Michelle Brownin et al., Supported Decision Making: Understanding How its
Conceptual Link to Legal Capacity is Influencing the Development of Practice, 1
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a system of support that would assist persons with disabilities in
making decisions even if the person would have been considered to
lack sufficient cognitive ability to make such a decision under
traditional doctrines of informed consent and capacity to contract.93
Advocates also proposed providing legal recognition to relationships
of trust in which supporters assist the person with a disability in
making a decision through a number of means, such as explaining
options in plain language, engaging in alternative forms of
communication, and interpreting the individual’s preferences.94
A. The Development of a Right to Legal Capacity
The revolutionary approach of these proposals was to decouple the
notion of “legal capacity”—the right “to make decisions and have
those decisions respected”95—from cognitive decision-making ability,
or what some have termed “mental capacity.”96 Legal capacity is a
human right, “a social and legal status accorded independent of a
person’s particular capabilities.”97 Whether an individual has the
cognitive ability to understand and appreciate consequences of her
decisions—the traditional threshold of the common law—is simply
not determinative of whether she has legal capacity. Even if she does
not possess those decision-making abilities, she cannot be stripped of
her legal capacity.98
Article 12 of the CRPD, adopted in 2006, embraced this approach
and mandates, as a human rights matter, that states “may not strip
individuals of their legal capacity based on disability.”99 As a number
of scholars have argued, Article 12 does not create any new rights to
legal capacity, but merely restates the rights that already exist for all,

RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 34,
35 (2014) (providing a useful and concise summary of the history of supported
decision-making).
93. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 72.
94. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 232–33.
95. BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 18.
96. “Mental capacity” is the phrase used in the first General Comment to the
CRPD. See CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 13.
97. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 18.
98. A number of human rights theorists further break down legal capacity into
two parts: “legal status,” which is the ability to hold rights that the state must
recognize, and “legal agency,” which is the ability to have one’s decisions recognized
by the law. Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, Legislating Personhood:
Realising the Right to Support in Exercising Legal Capacity, 10 INT’L J.L. IN
CONTEXT 81, 83 (2014).
99. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6.
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and applies them in the context of persons with disabilities.100 Article
12 also imposes an obligation on states to provide support to
individuals with disabilities so that they may exercise their legal
capacity.101 The individual, and not a surrogate, must hold the rights
to make decisions.102 All measures related to legal capacity must
“respect the rights, will and preferences of the person.”103
When the CRPD was adopted, there was some debate about
whether the convention permitted guardianship in certain
circumstances with safeguards, or whether it barred guardianship
completely.104 The U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities resolved this debate when it issued General Comment
No. 1, which took the position that all forms of substitute decisionmaking are forbidden under Article 12.105 “[S]ubstitute decisionmaking regimes such as guardianship, conservatorship and mental

100. See Piers Gooding, Navigating the ‘Flashing Amber Lights’ of the Right to
Legal Capacity in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: Responding to Major Concerns, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 46–47 (2015).
101. See CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 3. Leslie Salzman argues that
support is also required under domestic law, specifically the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 157 (arguing that guardianship
violates the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act and that
accommodations in the form of supported decision-making must be provided); see
also Salzman, supra note 10, at 280.
102. See Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness - A Legal
and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 306 (2011)
(individuals must hold the rights to make decisions in supported decision-making
regimes as opposed to traditional guardianship models).
103. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 22.
104. Amita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention:
Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. &
COM. 429, 447–48, 455–56 (2007) (describing a variety of interpretations that nations
ascribed to the text of Article 12).
105. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 3 (“[T]he Committee observes that
there is a general misunderstanding of the exact scope of the obligations of States
parties under article 12 of the Convention. Indeed, there has been a general failure
to understand that the human rights-based model of disability implies a shift from the
substitute decision-making paradigm to one that is based on supported decisionmaking.”). In the human rights parlance of Article 12, “substitute decision-making”
refers to regimes that “permit the removal of legal capacity from certain individuals
and vest it in third parties, who generally base decisions on the perceived objective
best interests of the person.” Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, The Support
Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 124, 125
(2014). In contrast, in the United States, “substituted judgment” has been used to
refer to a particular type of decision-making that a surrogate engages in when she
makes decisions based on what the person would have wanted. See Glen, supra note
25, at 116. Thus, in the human rights context of Article 12, “substitute decisionmaking” refers more broadly to all forms of surrogate decision-making not done at
the person’s direction. Id.
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health laws that permit forced treatment . . . must be abolished in
order to ensure that full legal capacity is restored to persons with
disabilities on an equal basis with others,” the committee opined.106
Substitute decision-making is impermissible even with regard to a
single decision, the General Comment states.107
In place of regimes such as guardianship, the General Comment
called for states to instead provide support to assist persons with
disabilities to exercise their legal capacity.108 Support, the General
Comment states, is “a broad term that encompasses both informal
and formal support arrangements, of varying types and intensity.”109
The General Comment further requires that when a person’s will and
preferences cannot be ascertained, a decision must be made using the
“best interpretation of will and preferences,” and not “best interests,”
as many substitute decision-making regimes require.110 What precise
mechanism can be used to make this decision remains an open
question.111
It is worth pausing here to consider why the U.S. legal community
should care about the CRPD, or an interpretation of it, when the
United States has not even ratified the treaty. Moreover, even if the
treaty were ratified, its application to state guardianship laws would
be somewhat attenuated. President Obama signed the treaty with the
United States’ standard “federalism” reservation, which limits
enforcement of the treaty to matters of federal law; state and local
law—of which guardianship is a creature—could not be governed by
the treaty unless those laws violated federal law or the
Constitution.112 Nonetheless, by signing the treaty, under established

106. See CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 7.
107. See id. ¶¶ 27, 28 (the CRPD requires the abolition of substitute decisionmaking regimes).
108. See id. ¶ 28.
109. See id. ¶ 17.
110. See id. ¶ 21 (stating that the “best interpretation of will and preferences”
standard “respects the rights, will and preferences of the individual”).
111. Bach & Kerzner have called this state “facilitated decision-making” in which a
facilitator might be appointed by an administrative tribunal (should there be no
advance directives in place naming a chosen decision-maker) but have not spelled out
in precise detail the mechanics for its implementation. See BACH & KERZNER, supra
note 91, at 91.
112. See LUISA BLANCHFIELD & CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42749, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES: ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 10 (2015). Although
guardianship is a creature of state law, the convention could nonetheless apply to it if
guardianship were found to violate federal law. My colleague Leslie Salzman has
argued compellingly that state guardianship laws do violate federal law by running
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international law principles, the United States is bound not to defeat
its object and purpose.113
Regardless of whether the treaty creates binding domestic legal
obligations as a technical matter, it is having a significant impact on
practice and on shaping the disability rights agenda. Internationally,
the convention has prompted a number of nations to reexamine their
guardianship laws.114 In the United States, the convention has also
been cited in several cases as persuasive authority on the rights of
persons with disabilities to make their own decisions.115 And perhaps
most importantly, it serves as a guidepost for law reform advocates
and others pursuing the development of alternatives to guardianship
domestically.116
B.

Support in Practice

How do these concepts work in practice? There is no one model
for supported decision-making, and the term is often used to connote
a wide variety of arrangements that assist persons in making decisions
and avoiding guardianship.117 Some theorists distinguish between
“support” and supported decision-making, with the former referring
afoul of the integration mandate of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. See

generally Salzman, supra note 10, at 157.

113. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., COLUMBIA LAW SCH., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS
HOME: HOW STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN USE HUMAN RIGHTS TO
ADVANCE LOCAL POLICY 3 & n.13 (2012), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/Bringing%20Human%20Rights%20
Home.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A7G-5BAB].
114. For example, the Australian Law Reform Commission has issued a
comprehensive report reviewing Australian laws for compliance with the right to
legal capacity. See generally AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, EQUALITY,
CAPACITY & DISABILITY IN COMMONWEALTH LAWS (2014), https://www.alrc.gov.au/
sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/alrc_124_summary_report_whole_pfd_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4H58-HPCW]. For a compilation of the efforts that various
countries have made to conform their laws to Article 12, see ARLENE S. KANTER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISABILITY RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM
CHARITY TO HUMAN RIGHTS 269–77 (2015).
115. See In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 855 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
2012); In re Mark C.H., 28 Misc. 3d 766, 786 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010).
116. See generally Arlene S. Kanter, Guardianship for Young Adults with

Disabilities as a Violation of the Purpose of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act, 8 J. INT’L AGING L. & POL’Y, 1, 56–61 (2015).

117. Terry Carney and Fleur Beaupert have pointed out that supported decisionmaking is a somewhat ill-defined term that has come to refer to a variety of
arrangements, some of which entail long-existing informal assistance with decisionmaking and some of which are done under the auspices of more recent legislation to
create new types of legally recognized relationships. Terry Carney & Fleur Beaupert,

Public and Private Bricolage—Challenges Balancing Law, Services & Civil Society in
Advancing CRPD Supported Decision Making, 36 U. N.S.W. L.J. 175, 178 (2013).
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to accommodations, such as accessible formats and technological
assistance that enable an individual to process information and
communicate a legally binding decision on her own. The latter, in
contrast, entails arrangements in which a supporter whom the
individual trusts interprets her will and preference and communicates
that to third parties, who then legally recognize the decision as valid
on behalf of the individual.118
As Jonathan Martinis and Peter Blanck point out, supported
decision-making exists already in a multitude of forms; we all turn to
supporters to assist us in making decisions—whether we ask advice,
seek explanations, or designate someone to interface with an agency
on our behalf.119 Arlene Kanter also notes that individuals with
intellectual disabilities have long turned to supportive arrangements
with others—from informal programs such as “circles of support”
(groups of volunteers convened to support an individual in realizing
their goals) to more formal mechanisms such as joint accounts,
powers of attorney and health care proxies—to avoid guardianship
and its attendant finding of incapacity.120
Various legal regimes also have long acknowledged de facto
supported decision-making, without naming it so. For example, the
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct contemplate that a lawyer
should maintain “as far as reasonably possible” a normal lawyerclient relationship with a person with diminished capacity and the
comment suggests that the lawyer may have family members
participate in the discussion in order to assist in the representation of
the client.121 Federal courts permit “incompetent” individuals to
appear by a guardian ad litem or “next friend,” who may bring the

118. See Gooding, supra note 100, at 58–59 (describing distinctions drawn by
Canadian Association of Community Living). Bach & Kerzner categorize three types
of support:

“Supports to assist in formulating one’s purposes, to explore the range of choices
and to make a decision;

Supports to engage in the decision-making process with other parties to make
agreements that give effect to one’s decision, where one’s decisions requires this;
and

Supports to act on the decisions that one has made, and to meet one’s
obligations under any agreements made for that purpose.”
BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 73.
119. Peter Blanck & Jonathan G. Martinis, ‘‘The Right to Make Choices’’: The
National Resource Center for Supported Decision-Making, 3 INCLUSION 24, 26
(2015), http://bbi.syr.edu/publications/2015/SDM_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3B7K-THU3].
120. See Kanter, supra note 116, at 52–53, 60–61.
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 & cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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suit on the other’s behalf without a formal proceeding or declaration
of incompetency.122 Social Security, Medicaid, and other government
programs implicitly recognize that a recipient may need support from
family members or others in accessing benefits.123 For example, these
programs have adopted mechanisms that permit assistance from
others in the application and recertification processes.124 Even the
HIPAA medical privacy regulations—which are widely assumed to
restrict the involvement of anyone other than a patient in her care—
contemplate that there may be times in which a medical professional
may need to communicate with a person involved in the patient’s care
in order to facilitate that care.125
The primary way in which supported decision-making has been
implemented as a new formal concept has been through legislation
recognizing supported decision-making agreements.
These
agreements permit a person to designate a supporter even if the
person would be found to lack the requisite cognitive capacity to
enter into other types of contracts or a power of attorney. The
example often touted as a model internationally is the British
Columbia Representation Agreement Act (BCRAA), enacted in
1996.126 The Act permits an individual to enter an agreement to
designate supporters (even if that individual lacks the mental capacity
to contract) and requires third parties to recognize those
agreements.127 The BCRAA presumes that all adults are capable of
entering such agreements.128 However, the Act also contemplates
that an adult may be deemed incapable of making an agreement
based on several factors, including whether she is able to demonstrate

122. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(2).
123. For example, the Social Security Administration provides that a family
member or other person responsible for the care of a claimant may sign an
application for benefits and has long provided for the appointment of a
representative payee when someone is unable to manage their benefits on their own.
See Program Operations Manual System, Social Security Administration, POMS GN
00204.003(B)(1)(c), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200204003 [https://perma.cc/
AL6X-DKJZ]; 20 C.F.R. § 416.601 (1995) (representative payee). The Medicaid
program similarly permits recipients to designate authorized representatives to apply
for benefits and otherwise interact with the agency on behalf of the individual. 42
C.F.R. § 435.923 (2013).
124. 42 C.F.R. § 435.923 (2013).
125. See 45 C.F.R § 164.510(b)(3) (2013) (permitting limited disclosure of
protected health information to third party involved in patient’s care when patient is
incapacitated or not present).
126. See Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 405 (Can.).
127. Id. § 8. For a concise description of the Act, see Glen, supra note 25, at 14546.
128. See Glen, supra note 25, at 147.
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choices and preferences and whether she has a relationship of trust
with the supporter.129 Thus, the model does not completely supplant
the possible need to resort to guardianship for those unable to meet
these thresholds. Additional legislative models that incorporate
varying degrees of supported decision-making can also be found in
several other Canadian provinces, as well as in Sweden and
Germany.130
More recently, Texas became the first state in the United States to
pass a supported decision-making statute. The Texas Supported
Decision-Making Agreement Act’s statutory purpose is to recognize
“a less restrictive alternative to guardianship for adults with
disabilities who need assistance with decisions regarding daily living
but who are not considered incapacitated persons for purposes of
establishing a guardianship” under the state’s guardianship statute.131
The new statute permits an adult with a disability to authorize a
supporter who may assist the individual in making and
communicating decisions, as well as in accessing information
necessary for such decisions and providing assistance in
understanding that information.132 Notably, the Texas law does not
contain an explicit cognitive threshold for entering into a supported
decision-making agreement; instead, it merely requires that the
individual act “voluntarily,” in the absence of coercion or undue

129. The Act states that adults can be deemed incapable of making a supported
decision-making agreement by looking at these factors:

Whether the adult communicates a desire to have a representative make, help
make, or stop making decisions;

Whether the adult demonstrates choices and preferences and can express
feelings of approval or disapproval of others;

Whether the adult is aware that making the representation agreement or
changing or revoking any of the provisions means that the representative may
make, or stop making, decisions or choices that affect the adult; and

Whether the adult has a relationship with the representative that is characterized
by trust.
Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 405, § 2(8) (Can.); see also Glen,
supra note 25, at 147. In this way, by retaining some level of functional analysis of
decision-making ability, the Act does not go as far as the Article 12 General
Comment, which calls for the abolition of all functional evaluations of decisionmaking on the grounds that they are “discriminatorily applied to people with
disabilities” and used to deny basic human rights based on a presumption that they
can “assess the inner workings of the human mind.” See CRPD General Comment,
supra note 6, ¶15.
130. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 235–37 (describing the Swedish model); Glen,
supra note 25, at 140–53.
131. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.003 (West 2015).
132. Id. § 1357.051.
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influence.133 The statute contemplates that a supporter would engage
in:
[A] process of supporting and accommodating an adult with a
disability to enable the adult to make life decisions, including
decisions related to where the adult wants to live, the services,
supports, and medical care the adult wants to receive, whom the
adult wants to live with, and where the adult wants to work, without
impeding the self-determination of the adult.134

The statutory form agreement permits an individual to authorize a
supporter to assist with food, clothing, shelter, health, and finances
and is clear that the supporter may not make decisions for the
person.135 Rather, the supporter is authorized to obtain information,
help the person understand it, and help the person communicate her
decision.136 The statute also requires third parties who are presented
a copy of the agreement to rely upon it and immunizes them from
civil and criminal liability for acting in good faith in reliance on the
agreement.137
Texas’s law is new, having passed in 2015; the following year,
Delaware also enacted a supported decision-making law.138 The
implementation of the laws in these two states will be closely followed
and it is likely that additional laws and policies will formalize the
practice of supported decision-making in the United States. In 2014,
Virginia’s legislature passed a resolution requiring the state
Department of Health and Human Resources to complete a study on
supported decision-making.139 The federal Department of Health
and Human Services has also endorsed the concept and funded the
creation of a national resource center to train practitioners and
research supported decision-making.140

133. See id. The Texas Supported Decision Making Agreement Act does not
define “voluntarily” other than to modify it by saying “without undue influence or
coercion.” Id.
134. Id. § 1357.002.
135. Id. § 1357.056.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 1357.101.
138. 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 214 (West); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16, Chapter
94A (2016).
139. H.R.J. Res. 190 (Va. 2014) https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?141+
ful+HJ190ER+pdf [https://perma.cc/DGB7-BCUF].
140. See Bishop & Walker, supra note 12.
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III. SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL
CAPACITY FOR OLDER ADULTS
So far, supported decision-making has largely been talked about as
an alternative to guardianship for persons with intellectual
disabilities141 and to a slightly lesser extent, persons with psychosocial
disabilities.142 Most of the supported decision-making pilot projects
have identified persons with intellectual disabilities as their target
groups.143
But, to date, supported decision-making has not taken hold to
quite the same degree—in both the theoretical discussions and in
practice—as an alternative for older adults who may be vulnerable to
guardianship.144 For example, while supported decision-making
agreements have become popular within the intellectual disability
community in Canada, they have not been embraced as readily by
elder law practitioners or by the aging community.145 This does not
mean that older adults have not practiced supported decision-making
informally, as many do turn to family and friends for support in
critical decisions. But a recent report commissioned by the Ontario
Law Commission on the experience of formal supported decisionmaking agreements in five provinces suggests that older adults do not

141. See Dinerstein, supra note 36, at 3 (2012); Kohn et al, supra note 14, at 1133
(“supported decision-making is often seen as particularly likely to benefit those with
ID”). But see TERRY CARNEY, GUARDIANSHIP, “SOCIAL” CITIZENSHIP AND
THEORIZING SUBSTITUTE DECISION-MAKING LAW 1, 3, 22 (2012).
142. See generally Salzman, supra note 10.
143. See, e.g., Pilot Project, supra note 13; (describing pilot project for individuals
with intellectual or developmental disabilities in Massachusetts); MARGARET
WALLACE, OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, EVALUATION OF THE SUPPORTED
DECISION
MAKING
PROJECT
15
(2012),
http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/files/
batch1376447055_final_supported_decision_making_evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A6BU-T23P] (describing pilot project for persons with disabilities).
144. But see Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities and its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under
International Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 559–64 (2009) (discussing the advances

that Article 12 offers for older adults).
145. See generally KRISTA JAMES & LAURA WATTS, CANADIAN CTR. FOR ELDER
LAW, UNDERSTANDING THE LIVED EXPERIENCES OF SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING
IN CANADA: A STUDY PAPER 18 (2014) (report commissioned by the Law
Commission of Ontario assessing experiences with supported decision-making in five
Canadian provinces). But see NIDUS PERSONAL PLANNING RESOURCE CTR. AND
REGISTRY, A STUDY OF PERSONAL PLANNING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA:
REPRESENTATION
AGREEMENTS
WITH
STANDARD
POWERS
2
(2010)
http://www.nidus.ca/PDFs/Nidus_Research_RA7_InAction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
CW4A-GTDB] [hereinafter Nidus] (finding that forty percent of representation
agreements, which are a tool for supported decision making, entered into in a three
and a half year period were by persons ages seventy to ninety-nine).
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use them as frequently as might be expected.146 Part III describes the
differences in circumstances that give rise to guardianship for older
adults with cognitive impairments versus younger persons with
intellectual disabilities, and reviews possible explanations for
different levels of engagement with supported decision-making.
There are several differences between the situations of older adults
at risk of guardianship and younger adults with disabilities that may
account for the different levels of interest in supported decisionmaking so far. Parents of persons with intellectual disabilities often
commence guardianships over their young adult children because
service providers suggest it as a routine step to take when the child
turns eighteen.147 Standard advice given to parents is that they need
guardianships in order to continue being involved in assisting their
child in obtaining benefits and services.148 Thus, for young adults
with intellectual disabilities and their families, supported decisionmaking can provide a welcome alternative that permits persons with
disabilities to build skills that can promote independence while
developing experience with making decisions that can facilitate
independent living.149
For older adults, when guardianship is sought by a family member,
it is often adult children who petition the court.150 Often, some
precipitating event prompts the guardianship, such as a legal
transaction that needs to be accomplished which may involve assets
that the person accumulated over the course of a lifetime, such as a
house or retirement plan.151 If the individual has executed advance
directives such as a power of attorney for financial matters and health
care proxy or medical power of attorney for health care decisions,
guardianship will likely not be necessary, as third parties will
recognize these instruments.152
The family member seeking

146. JAMES & WATTS, supra note 145, at 77–78.
147. See, e.g., Kanter supra note 116, at 3, 15, 46.
148. See, e.g., Kanter supra note 116, at 15.
149. See, e.g., Kanter supra note 116, at 59–61.
150. JENUWINE, supra note 26, at 43 (“Among those cases in which the prospective
guardian was an adult child of the proposed ward, the majority (66%) were cases
where the ward was over the age of 75.”).
151. See, e.g., In re E.J.F., 983 N.Y.S.2d 202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (guardianship
necessary, in part, because retirement plan refused to release benefits to individual
due to his incapacity).
152. See, e.g., In re May Far C., 877 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (reversing
appointment of guardian because allegedly incapacitated person had previously
executed power of attorney which obviated the need for guardian). The standard
advice given to someone with early dementia is to execute these documents. See
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guardianship may be more concerned about expediency and ensuring
that there is a legally recognized way to manage the person’s affairs
than with preserving or promoting decision-making.153
Persons without family support who are impaired may find
themselves facing guardianship petitions after some sort of medical or
financial crisis. Health care institutions seek guardianship to make
health care decisions, effectuate discharge planning back to the
community, transfer a person to a nursing home from a hospital, or to
obtain payment.154 State social services agencies also petition for
guardianship over older adults, often in situations in which the
individual is deemed to be at risk and has no one to assist them.155
This practice points to another difference between older adults and
younger individuals who might enter a guardianship. Older adults
tend to be more isolated and may lack other sources of family or
community support. Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, the architects
of the British Columbia act and leading thinkers on supported
decision-making, have attributed the lack of supported decisionmaking in the aging community to these factors, reasoning that
because older people tend to be more isolated, they have fewer
people in their lives who could play the role of supporters.156

Planning Ahead, ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION, http://www.alz.org/care/alzheimers-

dementia-planning-ahead.asp [https://perma.cc/2CNP].
153. NIDUS, supra note 145, at 78 (noting that advance directives are viewed as
more efficient than supported decision-making agreements).
154. See Callahan & Romanick, supra note 44, at Slide 13 (showing hospitals as
petitioners in nine percent of cases and nursing homes as petitioners in fifteen
percent). For an example of a guardianship petition in which a hospital sought to use
the guardianship to transfer the person to a nursing home and to have the guardian
make major medical decisions without the person’s consent, see In re St. Luke’s
Hospital Center, 607 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1993), aff’d 640 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996). For descriptions of nursing home petitions for guardianships in
order to settle billing disputes, see Nina Bernstein, To Collect Debts: Nursing Homes
Are Seizing Control Over Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/nyregion/to-collect-debts-nursing-home-seizingcontrol-over-patients.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8RFT-3WAV]. For a description
of nursing home guardianship practice in order to obtain Medicaid benefits for the
resident, see Nancy Levitin, Nursing Home Petitioners and Guardianship, N.Y. ST. B.
ASS’N J., Sept. 2015, at 54.
155. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.06(a)(6) (McKinney 2004) (providing that
county department of social services may petition); Teaster et al., supra note 70, at
209 (noting that fifteen states permit public guardian programs to petition for
guardianships); see also In re Ardelia R., 812 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(example of an APS case in which older adult was found in her apartment without
water, food, electricity or heat).
156. BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 37 (report commissioned by the Law
Commission of Ontario).
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These explanations only go so far, however, in explaining the
difference. There also has not been the same type of movement
linking the right to legal capacity to a broader struggle for rights of
self-determination and access to services and independent living for
older adults with cognitive limitations. Organized groups concerned
with progressive age-related cognitive decline, for example, are
understandably focused on the urgent need for research and
treatment resources, as well as the considerable demands of
caregiving.157 To the extent the aging community has focused on
questions of legal decision-making, it has been much more in the area
of state prevention of elder abuse.158 In the words of the Canadian
Centre for Elder Law, they “have not yet generally embraced
supported decision-making as a formalistic concept of autonomy or
personhood . . . .”159
The Canadian study also hypothesizes that older adults turn to
advance directives such as powers of attorney because they are
quicker and more efficient than supported decision-making
agreements, which require work by the supporter to explain and assist
in the decision-making process.160 But supported decision-making
will always require more work than substitute decision-making,
whether the person being supported is a younger adult with
intellectual disability or an older adult with dementia. The question is
how much work and how many resources do supporters and society
choose to put into the endeavor?

157. See
Policy
and
Advocacy,
ALZHEIMER’S
ASS’N,
http://www.alz.org/research/funding/alzheimers_policy_and_advocacy.asp#voicing
[https://perma.cc/D288-MKNG].
158. See Benjamin Pomerance, Finding the Middle Ground on a Slippery Slope:
Balancing Autonomy and Protection in Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse, 16
MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 439, 447–48 (2015) (describing debates
over the development of mandatory elder abuse reporting laws).
159. NIDUS, supra note 145, at 77.
160. Id. at 52. Under a power of attorney, the principal empowers an agent to act
on her behalf. The agent is supposed to follow the principal’s instructions but if none
exist the agent may act in the best interests of the principal. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1505(2)(a)(1) (McKinney 2009). Thus, a power of attorney differs in
certain critical ways from a supported decision-making agreement, under which the
decision always remains in the hands of the individual and in which the will and
preferences of the individual, and not her best interests, guide the decision-making.
Like a supported decision-making agreement, a power of attorney can be revoked at
any time by the principal and does not result in a loss of legal capacity.
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IV. TOWARDS A NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION OF SUPPORTED
DECISION-MAKING FOR OLDER PERSONS
This is where the theoretical underpinnings of supported decisionmaking come into play. As articulated so far, they have been
primarily aimed at the experiences of persons with intellectual
disabilities and have not spoken in the same way to the situations
encountered by older adults with cognitive impairments. The same
principles, however, that animate the move away from guardianship
have particular meaning for older adults, including those living with
dementia. Part IV explores the chief arguments for the right to legal
capacity—autonomy and personhood—and applies them to older
adults.
Perhaps the most frequently invoked argument for a shift away
from guardianship is the promotion of autonomy for persons with
disabilities. Proponents have posited supported decision-making as a
means of liberation for persons with disabilities who have heretofore
been excluded from participating in the basic interactions that
constitute participation in society.161 Gerard Quinn, one of the
foremost thinkers on legal capacity, has articulated the theoretical
stakes as follows:
[Legal capacity] provides the legal shell through which to advance
personhood in the lifeworld. Primarily, it enables persons to sculpt
their own legal universe – a web of mutual rights and obligations
voluntarily entered into with others. So it allows for an expression
of the will in the lifeworld. That is the primary positive role of legal
capacity. Let me emphasise this. Legal capacity opens up zones of
personal freedom. It facilitates uncoerced interactions. It does so
primarily through contract law. 162

Built into this concept of promoting autonomy is another, related
idea—that one builds decision-making skills, and, with support, can
move into a more independent state, in which less support may be
necessary. For example, the CRPD General Comment states that
governments “have an obligation to provide training for persons
receiving support so that they can decide when less support is needed
or when they no longer require support in the exercise of their legal
capacity.”163 Similarly, Bach and Kerzner talk about using facilitated
decision-making—at least temporarily until the person has developed
161. BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 75.
162. GERARD QUINN, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, PERSONHOOD & LEGAL CAPACITY
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PARADIGM SHIFT OF ARTICLE 12 CRPD 10 (2010) (Concept
Paper for the Harvard Law School Project on Disability Conference, Cambridge).
163. CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 24.
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relationships of trust so the supporter can interpret the individual’s
will and preferences.164
This notion of improving decision-making ability over time is
designed to address the situation of persons with severe disabilities,
who may have been isolated or institutionalized, and to guard against
making assumptions about how much support an individual needs.
However, it does not always resonate with the experience of many
older persons, who have a lifetime of exercising legal capacity behind
them and may need more support over time, not less. Among the
very old, cognitive decline caused by Alzheimer’s is, at the moment,
progressive and irreversible. This is not to say that age-related
conditions inevitably result in cognitive decline.165 Other conditions,
such as cognitive impairments caused by stroke, may be temporary
and partially reversible.166 Certain dementias may also be temporary
or may progress quite slowly.167 But older adults at risk of losing their
capacity are generally in a different position than persons with
intellectual disabilities. The former have had decades of exercising
legal capacity and may require support for the first time to ensure
that they can continue to do so. The latter have not yet exercised
legal capacity and are developing the skills and experience that will
facilitate their ability to do so.
Just as legal capacity can serve as a means of liberation for younger
persons with disabilities, so too can it preserve the autonomy of older
adults.
Concerns for autonomy have long played a role in
guardianship reform efforts, but efforts to increase the autonomy of
persons under guardianship have simply not gotten very far in
practice. Statutes and standards call for balanced approaches that
limit the powers of guardians and respect the wishes of the person.168
But the evidence shows that as long as guardianship is the default, the
impetus will be to strip the individual of broad powers and
accommodate the needs of third parties.169 Thus, the default is one of
paternalism and protection from oneself, not one of autonomy in
which the individual is the legal actor.170 A paradigm shift toward
legal capacity as a right can take this thumb off the scale.
BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 24.
See Frolik, supra note 52, at 748.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2016); NAT’L
GUARDIANSHIP ASS’N, supra note 47, at 6.
169. See JAMES & WATTS, supra note 145, at 63 (addressing use of plenary
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

guardianships).
170. See generally Glen, supra note 25, at 137 n.200.
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By preserving autonomy and personhood for older persons, the
right to legal capacity protects important interests in different ways
than it does for younger persons. Bioethicist Bruce Jennings has
offered a compelling critique of the underlying paternalism of the
guardianship system as it applies to preventing risky behavior by
persons with dementia.171 He notes that the state finds its justification
for curbing liberties in the promise that it is protecting an individual
from harm so that she will be able to exercise more liberty later.172 In
the early dementia context, he argues, this justification does not really
apply:
However worthwhile and valuable what comes in the future may
be . . . it will not include greater freedom or autonomy. When
freedom is curtailed in early dementia it is final chances that are
being forgone, not first chances with plenty of second chances yet to
come. These are the last times something will be attempted or done,
and perhaps it is a recognition of this, however dimmed by disease,
that makes the desire to do something so curiously linger, even
intensify, after the physical or mental capacity to do it safely has
begun to slip away.173

In contrast, Jennings and others talk about a different model for
decision-making that is centered on the person as a subject, rather
than an object to be protected or an entity that must be subdued for
the convenience of third parties.174 This approach finds its roots in
the work of the late Tom Kitwood, a British Alzheimer’s specialist
who developed a theory of person-centered care for dementia.175
171. Bruce Jennings, Freedom Fading: On Dementia, Best Interests, and Public
Safety, 35 GA. L. REV. 593, 609 (2001).
172. Id. at 610.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 610–12, 610 n.27.
175. See generally TOM KITWOOD, DEMENTIA RECONSIDERED 8 (1997)

[hereinafter DEMENTIA RECONSIDERED] (defining personhood as “a standing or
status that is bestowed upon one human being, by others, in the context of
relationship and social being. It implies recognition, respect and trust”); Tom
Kitwood, Towards a Theory of Dementia Care: The Interpersonal Process, 13
AGEING & SOC’Y 51 (1993) [hereinafter The Interpersonal Process]; Tom Kitwood &
Kathleen Bredin, Towards a Theory of Dementia Care: Personhood and Well-being,
12 AGEING & SOC’Y 269 (1992) [hereinafter Personhood and Well-being]. The terms
“person-centered,” “personhood,” and “patient-centered” are used interchangeably
within the article, however they are synonymous. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3
(2001), https://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2001/
Crossing-the-Quality-Chasm/Quality%20Chasm%202001%20%20report%20brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5EV-RPKD] (defining “patient-centered” as “providing care that
is respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and values,
and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions”); Person Centered
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“Patient-centered” is a term used to signal a focus on the particular
preferences, values, and wishes of an individual in health care; life
planning for persons with disabilities; and other contexts.176 The
concept developed in the movement toward community integration
for persons with disabilities and has come to connote a process in
which an individual plans for her future by identifying goals and
needed supports to reach those goals, with the assistance of others
whom she chooses to involve.177 In this way, person-centered
planning laid some of the groundwork for supported decision-making.
In the Alzheimer’s context, person-centered care was a means of
focusing on the persistence of the self even as the disease
progresses178 and society perceives a “loss of the self.”179 Kitwood
and others have urged against making assumptions that a diagnosis of
dementia forecloses the ability to participate in person-centered
care.180 A small body of research from Kitwood and psychologists
such as Steven Sabat has focused on the persistence of “self” in the
face of Alzheimer’s disease and cautioned against taking cognitive
loss, measured in standard assessments, as indicative of the loss of
other aspects of the self that are socially constructed.181
The empirical literature on decision-making and independence for
older adults also shows that retaining control over decisions of daily
life is correlated with better physical and mental health outcomes.182
Planning, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE

FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, http://www.opwdd.ny.gov/opwdd_services_supports/person_centered_
planning [https://perma.cc/4BML-JNC4] (describing person-centered planning as a
“process directed by the person that helps us to learn how they want to live and
describes what supports are needed to help them move toward a life they consider
meaningful and productive”).
176. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 175, at 3; see also Person Centered
Planning, supra note 175.
177. See Glen, supra note 25, at 130.
178. Ruth M. Tappan et al., Persistence of Self in Advanced Alzheimer’s Disease,
31 IMAGE J. NURSING SCH. 121 (1999) (describing research on subjective experience
of persons).
179. See, e.g., David E. Guinn, Mental Competence, Caregivers, and the Process of

Consent: Research Involving Alzheimer’s Patients or Others with Decreasing Mental
Capacity, 11 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 230, 234 (2002).
180. See DEMENTIA RECONSIDERED, supra note 175, at 54–57; Katie Maslow,
Person-Centered Care for People with Dementia: Opportunities and Challenges, AM.

SOC’Y OF AGING (Nov. 2013), http://www.asaging.org/blog/person-centered-carepeople-dementia-opportunities-and-challenges [https://perma.cc/R8FX-XX2W].
181. See generally Steve R. Sabat, Surviving Manifestations of Selfhood in
Alzheimer’s Disease, 1 DEMENTIA 25 (2002).
182. See Melanie H. Mallers et al., Perceived Control in the Lives of Older Adults:

The Influence of Langer and Rodin’s work on Gerontological Theory, Policy, and
Practice, 54 GERONTOLOGIST 67, 67 (2014); see also Nina A. Kohn, Elder
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These benefits accrue not just when older adults act completely
independently, but also when they are given the opportunity to ask
for assistance from others.183 In that respect, the findings are
consistent with the theory advanced by supported decision-making
proponents that autonomy should be viewed not as wholly individual
but rather that it is something exercised “relationally,
interdependently, and intersubjectively with others.”184
In searching for ways to recognize the persistence of self, we can
find a way to effectuate one of the most ambitious aspects of the legal
capacity project: restoring and recognizing the humanity we all share,
regardless of the degree of impairment. Recognizing personhood is,
of course, central to the movement for legal capacity. Gerard Quinn
has stated that “legal capacity is the tool for advancing personhood in
the lifeworld—primarily by allowing us to construct our own legal
universes and secondarily to fend off others who think they know
better.”185 By decoupling the ability to understand and appreciate
from legal personhood, Quinn argues, we expand the notion of
personhood to include those who have historically been excluded.186
This is of no small value in the older adult context, as persons with
Alzheimer’s and dementia are routinely dehumanized in institutional
and other care settings through physical and chemical restraints and
other, less severe, means.187 In this way, supported decision-making
in the older adult context can play a role in preserving the individual’s
personhood and assisting them in what Bruce Jennings has called
“find[ing] new and different ways of being a self” for as long as it is
possible.188

Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden Abuses of Durable Powers of
Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2006) (summarizing psychological literature

on benefits of decision-making for seniors).
183. Mallers et al., supra note 182, at 69.
184. BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 40 (internal quotations omitted).
185. See QUINN, supra note 162, at 12.
186. See id. at 5-6.
187. See generally Julie A. Braun & Lawrence A. Frolik, Legal Aspects of
Chemical Restraint Use in Nursing Homes, 2 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 21 (2000);
Marshall B. Kapp, Physical Restraint Use in Acute Care Hospitals: Legal Liability
Issues, 1 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 1 (1999).
188. See Jennings, supra note 171, at 617-18.
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V. BUT CAN IT WORK? TESTING THE THEORETICAL AGAINST
PRACTICE
No one assumes that the shift away from guardianship will happen
overnight.189 Advocates anticipate a lengthy process during which
supported decision-making alternatives and infrastructure develop
while governments begin to review guardianship and other laws to
progressively implement reforms that respect the right to legal
capacity.190 The main arguments against supported decision-making
are not that it lacks normative justification, but rather that it is
untested and likely cannot work in all situations, that it requires
enormous resources, and/or that it will permit persons to make bad
choices or to be taken advantage of.191 It is hard to know how and if
supported decision-making could work in every case, which is why
many have called for pilot projects and assessments.192 But granting
that there are tremendous unknowns remaining, Part V sketches out a
number of ways in which the availability of supported decisionmaking statutes and services for older persons could lead to
reductions in the use of guardianship and provide other benefits. It
then outlines two areas in which thinking needs to develop further.
A. Tangible Benefits of the Right to Legal Capacity for Older
Adults
In this Section, I sketch three ways in which more widespread
availability of support and supported decision-making can offer
immediate benefits that enhance autonomy for older adults and
reduce the use of guardianship. First, the availability of supported
decision-making alternatives and services has the potential to limit
the already rickety enterprise of assessing mental capacity to restrict a
person’s legal right to make decisions. Assessments of capacity are
fraught with subjectivity and there appears to be no clear, consistent
way to measure mental capacity. In a fascinating summary of the
research on assessments of older adults’ capacity to consent to health
care, Jennifer Moye and Daniel C. Marson find wild variations in the
assessment of capacity.193 For example, when physicians conduct
189. See Glen, supra note 25, at 163-64 (describing the “incremental process”
proposed by the disability rights group Inclusion Europe).
190. See id. (describing the implementation of the plan as “gradual”).
191. See Gooding, supra note 100.
192. See Salzman, supra note 10, at 303-05.
193. See Jennifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson, Assessment of Decision-Making
Capacity in Older Adults: An Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62 J. OF
GERONTOLOGY 3 (2007).
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assessments of capacity based on their perceptions of different patient
cognitive skills, “agreement between physicians is near chance.”194
When using established instruments for measuring capacity,
agreement between physicians ranged from poor to good.195 They
conclude that “[c]linical judgments of capacity can often be
inaccurate, unreliable, and even invalid.”196 Thus, it seems as though
the entire enterprise of assessing mental capacity, from which so
many other legal consequences flow, is deeply flawed.
Nonetheless, these assessments are not likely to disappear anytime
soon. But, by incorporating principles of support into at least the
legal definitions of incapacity, it may be possible to reduce the
frequency of incapacity findings. So far, advocates have had greatest
success with presenting supported decision-making as an alternative
that can justify the termination of a guardianship. One of the bestknown examples is the case of Jenny Hatch, a young adult with an
intellectual disability who contested her parents’ petition for
guardianship and her placement in a group home, where she was cut
off from her friends and life in the community. The judge granted the
guardianship petition but appointed her friends as guardians instead
of her parents and instructed the guardians to prepare for a transition
to supported decision-making after a year.197 Such precedent—along
with several other recent cases198—holds promise for older adults who
may wish to get out from under guardianship, a notoriously difficult
process.199 The same principles of looking to whether a person can
make decisions with support should apply to deciding guardianship
applications at the outset. For most vulnerable older adults, the
initial petition for guardianship is the important moment at which the
availability of supported decision-making could prevent a declaration
of incapacity.
Second, to the extent that many older adults are pushed into
guardianship due to various third parties or “gatekeepers” rejecting

194. Id. at 6.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 9.
197. See Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426P-03, Slip Op. at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2013),
http://jennyhatchjusticeproject.org/docs/justice_for_jenny_trial/jhjp_trial_final_order.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XH78-RWBZ].
198. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 38 Misc. 3d 570, 579-80 (N.Y. Sur.
Ct. 2012); In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010); see also Cassidy,
supra note 78, at 85-86.
199. See Cassidy, supra note 78, at 119-20 (describing several recent successful
restoration cases in which persons under guardianship had developed supports as
alternatives).
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their capacity to understand and appreciate financial and medical
decisions, the broader availability of support and supported decisionmaking can reduce this practice.200 Typically, a person must
understand the relevant information, appreciate the consequences of
a decision and be able to communicate that decision voluntarily in
order for it to be legally binding.201 These elements underlie both the
doctrine of informed consent202 and capacity to contract.203
Frequently, family members of older adults turn to guardianship
because someone at a benefit program, a health care provider, or a
financial institution has decided that the older adult cannot
understand and appreciate a decision or because the older adult has
an impairment that prevents her from being able to obtain
information and communicate consent directly.204 Thus, the concept
of “capacity” becomes a barrier toward accessing needed benefits and
services. At this point, often the only recourse for a family member
trying to support the person in obtaining benefits or accessing services
or funds is to seek guardianship.205
But legal recognition for the role of a supporter who can assist the
older adult in obtaining information and making a decision could
enable the person to make legally binding decisions, and thus obviate
the need to resort to guardianship just to access services, benefits, or
funds. In addition, more explicit mandates for support would enable
the person to make the decision directly, without another acting as
her supporter. Forms of support might include plain language
explanations, accessible formats, and the like, as well as more
extensive use of some of the basic techniques for enhancing a person’s
200. See Soumitra Pathare & Laura S. Shields, Supported Decision-Making for
Persons with Mental Illness: A Review, 34 PUB. HEALTH REVS. 1, 2-4 (2012); see also
TOLUB, supra note 41, at 14.
201. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 83.
202. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) (finding that the

patient must be able to understand information conveyed, evaluate options, and
communicate a decision).
203. On capacity to contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing that contract is voidable “if by reason of mental
illness or defect . . . he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature
and consequences of the transaction” or “he is unable to act in a reasonable
manner . . . and the other party has reason to know of his condition” ); see also
Ortelere v. Teacher’s Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 464 (1969) (providing that the
traditional test for contractual mental capacity requires that the party is able to make
a rational judgment about the transaction). It is also black-letter law that each party
to a contract manifest her assent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM.
LAW INST. 1981).
204. See TOLUB, supra note 41, at 14.
205. See id.
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decision-making capabilities: taking extra time; engaging in multiple
visits, especially during the morning if that is when the person is most
alert; discussing one discrete issue at a time; repeating information,
and providing cues that enhance recall.206 Research on the ability to
provide informed consent confirms that such types of techniques, and
particularly those that minimize memory demands and verbal
retrieval—can support some individuals with dementia to the point
they can provide informed consent when they would otherwise be
deemed unable under standard screening instruments.207 These
techniques are feasible and should be already required by antidiscrimination laws, though application of those laws for these
particular accommodations has been underdeveloped to date.208
Third, on a practical level, the wider availability of supported
decision-making could force the legal, health care, and social services
systems to confront underlying failures without depriving persons of
their decision-making rights. As the expression goes, to a hammer,
everything looks like a nail. Guardianship is currently used as a
means of fixing many problems, only some of which have to do with
impairments in decision-making.209 For example, in New York City,
where I practice, it is common for the social services agency to file for
guardianship when a senior is on the verge of eviction.210 It is also
used by hospitals when patients disagree with a discharge plan,
particularly when the hospital wishes to discharge an individual to a

206. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 91, at 72–80 (describing decision-making
supports); A.B.A. COMM’N. ON L. & AGING, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER ADULTS WITH
DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 29 (2005).
207. See Julia Haberstroh et al., Can the Mini-Mental State Examination Predict
Capacity to Consent to Treatment?, 27 J. OF GERONTOPSYCHOLOGY & GERIATRIC
PSYCHIATRY 151, 156 (2014).
208. When an entity blocks an individual from accessing benefits or services that
she is otherwise entitled to on the grounds that she lacks cognitive capacity, such a
refusal should be deemed disability-based discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which prohibits a public agency or public accommodation from
denying benefits or services on the grounds of disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132,
12182(a) (2015).
209. The need for guardianship is often justified by the need for services or
assistance, which might alternatively have been provided through other means. See,
e.g., In re of Ella C., No. 100016/11, 2011 WL 6757850 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2011) (holding
that a guardian was necessary in part because of individual’s complicated real estate
holdings and finances).
210. See Shlomo S. Hagler, Innovative Part Integrates Guardianship and Housing
Matters; Outside Counsel, N.Y.L.J., June 22, 2011, at 4, 9 (describing special court
part that combines housing and guardianship matters).
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nursing home and the person wants to go home,211 or when other
discharge planning obstacles arise.212 Guardianship is also used by
nursing homes when no one is available to manage the person’s funds
so that she can become Medicaid eligible or to settle payment
disputes with relatives.213 To be sure, all of these situations present
significant problems and challenges; however, there is no reason that
these thorny problems should necessarily be resolved by stripping
individuals of their legal capacity. More rigorous protection of the
right to legal capacity would ensure that guardianship is not resorted
to as readily when problems concerning older adults arise.
B.

Outstanding Questions

Many challenges lie ahead for advocates seeking to promote the
right to legal capacity. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
respond to every objection or obstacle to supported decisionmaking.214 However, this section will focus on two key questions that
have particular significance for older adults and propose an agenda
for further thinking on those points.
First, how might the right to legal capacity apply in the really hard
cases of advanced Alzheimer’s when there are no advance directives
in place? According to the General Comment to Article 12, any form
of substitute decision-making, such as a guardianship—even imposed
for one transaction—would violate the individual’s right to legal
capacity.215 Instead, the General Comment proposes that “[w]here,
after significant efforts have been made, it is not practicable to
determine the will and preferences of an individual, the ‘best
interpretation of will and preferences’ must replace the ‘best interests’
determinations.”216
What mechanism should be used to discern a person’s will and
preferences if that person cannot use a supported decision-making
agreement? The General Comment does not answer this question.
211. See In re Bricker, 702 N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1999) (discussing
apportionment of costs when hospitals bring guardianships because patient disagrees
with a discharge plan).
212. See Joseph A. Rosenberg, Poverty, Guardianship, and the Vulnerable

Elderly: Human Narrative and Statistical Patterns in A Snapshot of Adult
Guardianship Cases in New York City, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 315, 342

(2009) (discussing use of guardianship to facilitate discharge planning by hospitals).
213. See Bernstein, supra note 154.
214. Piers Gooding has provided a useful list of common objections to Article 12
and responses. See Gooding, supra note 100, at 52–60.
215. See CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶¶ 27, 28.
216. See id. ¶ 21.
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In Texas and British Columbia, guardianship is the only option for
these individuals.217 However, Article 12 says guardianships are
never allowed.218 Thus, Article 12 seems to rely on a legal fiction that
persons will remain the legal actors making their own decisions under
circumstances where it may not be possible to discern their will and
preferences. The fiction serves a purpose in that it ensures that those
with the most severe impairments remain persons under the law. But
the contradiction and the mechanics of following Article 12’s
requirements need further elaboration in the literature, as the
pragmatic problems are so substantial that they risk undermining the
rest of the project.219
A tribunal or facilitator attempting to interpret the will and
preferences of an older person suffering from progressive cognitive
decline at least has the benefit of a lifetime of decisions and wishes to
examine – something that may not be the case when discerning the
will and preferences of younger persons with disabilities who have not
been afforded many decision-making opportunities. Nonetheless, the
record does not answer all the questions and there has been a debate
over how much prior wishes should matter as compared with wishes
expressed after the onset of Alzheimer’s disease.220 Ronald Dworkin
advocated for respecting the person’s earlier wishes, which he views
as reflecting her values and judgments built over a lifetime.221
Rebecca Dresser, in contrast, has emphasized adherence to the
person’s current wishes because the person may not be who she used
to be.222 Agnieszka Jaworska contrasts the two notions of autonomy
at play in Dworkin’s and Dresser’s work and stakes out a third
position that constructs autonomy as connected to values and
convictions, which she contends do not require someone to
necessarily recall their whole life story.223 For Jaworska, the capacity
to value requires that “the person thinks she is correct in wanting
217. Under many existing substitute judgment regimes, courts hold that decisions
should be made for a person based on her wishes, if known, and if not known based
on her best interests. See, e.g., In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1280 (N.J. 1994) (discussing
substituted judgment test as discerning “what choice the patient would have made if
able to choose”).
218. See CRPD General Comment, supra note 6, ¶ 4.
219. See Gooding, supra note 100, at 52.
220. See Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s
Patients and the Capacity to Value, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (1999).
221. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 218-41 (1993).
222. Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual
Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 373-405 (1986).
223. See Jaworska, supra note 220, at 116, 109.
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what she wants; achieving what she wants is tied up with her sense of
self-worth; and the importance of achieving what she wants is, for her,
independent of her own experience.”224 The neurological evidence,
she contends, shows that this capacity to value usually remains in the
brain long after the ability to remember and to reason may have been
damaged by Alzheimer’s.225
This recognition of values is a different formulation from the “will
and preferences” that Article 12 seeks to protect but, ultimately, is
not inconsistent with that idea and may have more resonance for
older persons with serious cognitive impairment. Jaworska roots
autonomy “in the ability to lay down the principles that will govern
one’s actions,” as opposed to the notion of will and preferences.226
Still, there is a kinship between the two concepts in that personhood
does not derive from the ability to effectuate either will and
preferences or values. As Jaworska notes, “means-ends reasoning
and planning are mere tools for implementing the principles” that a
person may have laid down for running their life.227 This formulation
of autonomy provides an underlying principle that may be useful in
guiding the development of mechanisms for determining will and
preferences to effectuate the right to legal capacity.
The second, and most significant challenge to supported decisionmaking, is to ensure that it will not make older adults more
vulnerable to abuse.228 Older adults, especially those with cognitive
impairments are at significant risk of being abused, especially
financially. Studies show that “between 3% and 5% of the older adult
population has experienced financial exploitation by a family member
in the past year.”229 A person’s declining cognitive function, even
among those who do not have dementia, appears to play a role in
their susceptibility to scams.230
The question is not whether there is elder abuse, as there is, or
whether older adults suffering from cognitive impairments are more
likely to be the targets of such abuse, as they are. The question is
whether a shift from a guardianship to supported decision-making
224. See id. at 116, 109.
225. See id. at 130.
226. See id. at 128-29 (noting that autonomy does not consist in the ability to
“devise and carry out the means and plans . . . ”).
227. See id.
228. See BACH AND KERZNER, supra note 91, at 37.
229. Prevalence and Diversity, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
elderjustice/research/prevalence-and-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/WZ8C-8N3H].
230. Bryan D. James et al., Correlates of Susceptibility to Scams in Older Adults
Without Dementia, 26 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGL. 107, 109 (2014).
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system would make individuals more vulnerable to abuse and limit
the ways in which they can seek redress for their harms. In thinking
about what the paradigm shift may bring, it is important to recognize
that guardianship itself can be the vehicle for elder abuse,231 as can
powers of attorney.232 It is impossible to say that supported decisionmaking will not be a vehicle, too.
The specific concerns about abuse and undue influence are as
follows. First, how can older adults with cognitive impairments be
protected from abuse and undue influence from those whom they
have appointed as supporters?233 The Texas statute builds in
protections by placing language on the supported decision-making
agreement form that requires persons who see it, and believe that the
individual is being abused, to report it to a state abuse hotline.234 The
British Columbia statute requires the appointment of a monitor, with
certain exceptions, in agreements authorizing the involvement of a
supporter in financial decisions; the monitor can request accounts and
other records and investigate whether the representative is complying
with the individual’s wishes.235 In addition, the statute explicitly
imposes some fiduciary duties on the supporter.236 More empirical
work remains to be done on how effective these mechanisms are.
In addition, if we move away from a guardianship system, are there
other mechanisms that can substitute for the remedies by which a
guardian can assist a cognitively impaired individual in un-doing
abusive transactions? How can we overcome the challenges to
implementing them? It is worth noting that elder abuse advocates
have raised questions about the limits of guardianship as a tool to
address elder abuse. In a piece describing typical cases at an elder
abuse shelter in the Bronx, New York, advocates note that abuse may
produce cognitive and emotional decline, and result in “anguish, guilt,
and shame—feelings that may present as a lack of decision-making
ability. These factors make it even more likely that, for victims of
elder abuse, guardianship petitions may be filed inappropriately.”237

231. See GAO-10-1046, supra note 79 at 6-7.
232. See Kohn, supra note 182, at 3.
233. In the review of experience with supported decision-making in five provinces,
the Canadian Centre for Elder Law found that concern about abuse was a significant
barrier for older adults with dementia. See JAMES & WATTS, supra note 145, at 52.
234. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.056(a) (West 2015).
235. See Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 405 §§ 12, 20 (Can.).
236. See id. § 16.
237. Joy Solomon et al., Changing of the Guardians: A Criticism and Analysis of
the New York Guardianship Statute’s Impact on Elder Abuse Victims, 10 NAT’L
ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’Y J. 149, 162 (2014).
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But it is undeniable that guardianship can be a useful tool for
stopping abuse and voiding one-sided transactions, entered into
directly by the person or by an agent abusing a power of attorney.238
However, it is likely that guardianship has been used as a tool to do
the work that other doctrines designed to protect persons from
exploitation could do, but without depriving the victims of their right
to legal capacity. More thinking and empirical work needs to be done
to identify the particular ways in which common law doctrines of
undue influence, fraud, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and the
like, along with consumer protection statutes, can be utilized in
situations in which guardianships currently provide a ready and
expedient remedy.239
CONCLUSION
The growing call for a shift from guardianship to supported
decision-making reflects the convergence of two different reform
efforts: one historically devoted to improving the process of
guardianship and another emerging out of the disability rights and
independent living movements. Despite the historical disconnect
between these groups, they are increasingly converging, and those
concerned with the guardianship process have begun to embrace
supported decision-making as a viable and worthwhile alternative.240
Supported decision-making and the right to legal capacity have
become topics at conferences on guardianships and aging, and have
been endorsed by a range of entities concerned with the legal rights of
older adults.241 Supported decision-making has significant promise as
a legal arrangement and practice that can preserve and enhance the
autonomy of older adults who would otherwise be at risk of

238. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.23(b) (McKinney 2004) (authorizing
guardianship court to craft broad injunctive relief to prevent harm to incapacitated
person); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.43 (McKinney 2004) (creating clawback
procedure by which guardian can get back property taken from incapacitated
persons).
239. See Carney & Beaupert, supra note 117, at 197 (noting that “these remedies
are ill-suited in practice to the needs of ordinary people lacking the financial and
other resources to successfully correct financial abuse or mismanagement”).
240. See Glen, supra note 25, at 138–39 (describing embrace of supported decisionmaking concepts at the 2011 National Guardianship Summit).
241. See id.; see also A.B.A. COMM’N ON L. & AGING, Supported Decision-making
Encouraged at National Aging and Law Conference, http://www.americanbar.org/
news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2015/11/supported_decision-m.html
[https://perma.cc/P6AM-53CM] (describing session encouraging supported decision
making at National Aging and the Law Conference). The author was a participant in
this session.

538

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

guardianship while preserving their personhood in the eyes of the law.
In order to realize these significant benefits, more work remains to be
done to articulate a model that rings true for the situation of older
adults and addresses their particular pragmatic concerns.242

242. See generally Kohn et al., supra note 14 (arguing that little was known about
how supported decision-making works in practice and proposing an empirical
research agenda).

